Theory of Mind

At the core of social interaction lies the ability to understand and predict human behavior. This requires the development of a Theory of Mind—an understanding of the workings of the human mind—and the ability to use this knowledge to understand social interactions or predict how they may unfold. The use of Theory of Mind is known to involve a widespread network of brain regions. Our research seeks to identify the fundamental cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie this capacity.

Some of our findings...

Inhibition, mentalizing and the right inferior frontal gyrus

• Qureshi, Adam W., Monk, Rebecca L., Samson, Dana, & Apperly, Ian A. (2020). Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 27, 178-190. doi :10.3758/s13423-019-01656-z

• Samson, Dana, Houthuys, Sarah, & Humphreys, Glyn W (2015). Self-perspective inhibition deficits cannot be explained by general executive control difficulties. Cortex, 70, 189-201. doi :10.1016/j.cortex.2014.12.021

• Qureshi, Adam W., Apperly, Ian A., & Samson, Dana (2010). Executive function is necessary for perspective selection, not Level-1 visual perspective calculation : evidence from a dual-task study of adults. Cognition, 117(2), 230-236. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.003

• Samson, Dana, Apperly, Ian A, Kathirgamanathan, Umalini, & Humphreys, Glyn W (2005). Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Brain, 128(5), 1102-1111. doi :10.1093/brain/awh464

Belief tracking in adults

• Meert, Gaëlle, Wang, Jessica, & Samson, Dana (2017). Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning. Cognition, 168, 91-98. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

• Apperly, Ian A., Back, Elisa, Samson, Dana, & France, Lisa (2008). The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task . Cognition, 106(3), 1093-108. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2007.05.005

• Apperly, Ian A., Riggs, Kevin J., Simpson, Andrew, Chiavarino, Claudia, & Samson, Dana (2006). Is belief reasoning automatic? . Psychological science, 17(10), 841-4. doi :10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01791.x

Posterior left TPJ plays a critical role in tracking spontaneously other people's thoughts

In a Nature Neuroscience paper (2004), we showed that the left temporo-parietal junction (left pTPJ) is necessary for belief reasoning. In a subsequent study, we refined the role of this specific brain region by showing that it helps spontaneously tracking what other people think. More specifically, we have shown that when the left pTPJ is damaged, the patients cannot spontaneously infer anymore that someone else has a false belief. However, these very same patients were perfectly able to infer other people's false beliefs when explicitly asked to do so. Although several studies have shown that the right TPJ plays a more specific role in mental state attribution than the left TPJ, we bring new evidence showing that the left TPJ is also crucial for efficient ToM processing. This finding has been reported in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (2016).

• Biervoye, Aurélie, Dricot, Laurence, Ivanoiu, Adrian, & Samson, Dana (2016). Impaired spontaneous belief inference following acquired damage to the left posterior temporoparietal junction. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (Print), 11(10), 1513-1520. doi :10.1093/scan/nsw076

• Apperly, Ian A, Samson, Dana, Chiavarino, Claudia, & Humphreys, Glyn W (2004). Frontal and temporoparietal lobe contributions to theory of mind: Neuropsychological evidence from a false-belief task with reduced language and executive demands. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 16(10), 1773-1784. doi :10.1162/0898929042947928

• Samson, Dana, Apperly, Ian A., Chiavarino, Claudia, & Humphreys, Glyn W (2004). Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 499-500. doi :10.1038/nn1223

On the role of the left temporal pole in mentalizing

• Michel, Caroline, Dricot, Laurence, Lhommel, Renaud, Grandin, Cécile, Ivanoiu, Adrian, Pillon, Agnesa, & Samson, Dana (2013). Extensive left temporal pole damage does not impact on theory of mind abilities. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25, 2025-2046. doi :10.1162/jocn_a_00488

Theoretical contributions

• Samson, Dana. (2018). Neurosciences cognitives et théorie de l'esprit. In Encyclopædia Universalis [en ligne]. France: Encyclopædia Universalis.

• Samson, Dana. (2013). Theory of Mind. In Daniel Reisberg, The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology (p. 943-956). New-York: Oxford University Press

• Samson, Dana, & Michel, Caroline. (2013). Theory of mind: Insights from patients with acquired brain damage. In Simon Baron-Cohen, & Helen Tager-Flusberg and Michael V. Lombardo, Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental social neuroscience (p. 164-177). Oxford University Press.

• Samson, Dana, & Apperly, Ian A. (2010). There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts : new directions in theory of mind research. Infant and Child Development, 19(5), 443-454. doi :10.1002/icd.678

• Samson, Dana (2009). Reading other people's mind : insights from neuropsychology. Journal of Neuropsychology, 3(1), 3-16. doi :10.1348/174866408X377883

• Apperly, Ian A., Samson, Dana, & Humphreys, Glyn W. (2009). Studies of adults can inform accounts of theory of mind development. Developmental Psychology, 45(1), 190-201. doi :10.1037/a0014098

• Apperly, IA, Samson, Dana, & Humphreys, GW (2005). Domain-specificity and theory of mind: evaluating neuropsychological evidence . Trends in cognitive sciences, 9(12), 572-577. doi :10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004

Clinical related publications

• Samson, Dana. (2023). L'évaluation des troubles de la cognition sociale. In Hélène Amieva, & Philippe Azouvi, Emmanuel Barbeau, Fabienne Collette, Traité de neuropsychologie clinique de l'adulte (p. 557-572).

• Biervoye, Aurélie, Meert, Gaëlle, Apperly, Ian A., & Samson, Dana (2018). Assessing the integrity of the cognitive processes involved in belief reasoning by means of two nonverbal tasks: Rationale, normative data collection and illustration with brain-damaged patients. PLOS ONE, 13, e0190295. doi :10.1371/journal.pone.0190295

• Maurage, François, de Timary, Philippe, Tecco, Juan Martin, Lechantre, Stéphane, & Samson, Dana (2015). Theory of Mind Difficulties in Patients with Alcohol Dependence: Beyond the Prefrontal Cortex Dysfunction Hypothesis. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 39(6), 980-988. doi :10.1111/acer.12717

• Samson, Dana. (2012). Neuropsychologie de la théorie de l’esprit chez l’adulte : Etat de l'art et implications cliniques. In Philippe ALLAIN, & Ghislaine AUBIN et Didier LE GALL, Cognition sociale et neuropsychologie (p. 47-64). Marseille: Solal.

• Samson, Dana, Apperly, Ian A., & Humphreys, Glyn W. (2007). Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in "theory of mind": Neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task . Neuropsychologia, 45(11), 2561-9. doi :10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.03.013