Photo from the streets of Valparaiso, Chile
© 2024, Dana Samson
Visual perspective-taking is one of the most fundamental social abilities found in humans and various animal species. It can arise from low-level attentional processes as well as higher-level cognitive mechanisms involving self-other processing. We investigate the cognitive and neural underpinnings of these two types of processes and how they operate in different social contexts.
Some of our findings...
The DOT paradigm
(level 1 visual perspective taking task)
JEP:HPP, 2010
Some participants find it harder to respond when they see a different number of dots than the avatar (IS and IO compared to CS and CO). These participants have difficulties in handling conflicting perspectives.
Some other participants find it easier to tell what the avatar sees than what they themselves see (CO compared to CS). For these participants, the other-perspective is more salient than their own perspective while other participants show the reverse pattern.
These are contrasting profiles found in the general population and each profile can be exarcebated in subclinical or clinical conditions.
New insights into inter-individual differences in perspective taking
Bukowski, Henryk, & Samson, Dana (2021). Automatic imitation is reduced in narcissists but only in egocentric perspective-takers. Acta Psychologica, 213, 103235. doi :10.1016/j.actpsy.2020.103235
Bukowski, Henryk, & Samson, Dana (2017). New Insights into the Inter-Individual Variability in Perspective Taking. Vision, 1, 8. doi :10.3390/vision1010008
Neural markers of visual perspective taking
Beck, Alexy Assaf, Rossion, Bruno, & Samson, Dana (2018). An objective neural signature of rapid perspective taking. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 13, 72-79. doi :10.1093/scan/nsx135
Ramsey, Richard, Hansen, Peter, Apperly, Ian, & Samson, Dana (2013). Seeing it my way or your way : frontoparietal brain areas sustain viewpoint-independent perspective selection processes. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25, 670-684. doi :10.1162/jocn_a_00345
Schurz, Matthias, Kronbichler, Martin, Weissengruber, Sebastian, Surtees, Andrew David, Samson, Dana, & Perner, Josef (2015). Clarifying the role of theory of mind areas during visual perspective taking: Issues of spontaneity and domain-specificity. NeuroImage, 117, 386-396. doi :10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.04.031
Factors influencing perspective taking
Deliens, Gaétane, Bukowski, Henryk, Slama, Hichem, Surtees, Andrew, Cleeremans, Axel, Samson, Dana, & Peigneux, Philippe (2018). The impact of sleep deprivation on visual perspective taking. Journal of Sleep Research, 27, 175-183. doi :10.1111/jsr.12595
Bukowski, Henryk, & Samson, Dana (2016). Can emotions influence level-1 visual perspective taking?. Cognitive Neuroscience, 7(1-4), 182-191. doi :10.1080/17588928.2015.1043879
Do we "automatically" compute what or where someone else is looking at?
Automaticity is a complex construct in cognitive sciences which usually refers to processes that have the following main characteristics: (1) the processes are stimulus-driven, that is, the mere presence of a stimulus triggers the processing; (2) the processes are effortless, that is, they require little cognitive ressources and operate even under dual-task conditions; and (3) the processes are involuntary, that is they operate beyong our control. While there is evidence from both the visual perspective-taking (including our own study in JEP:HPP, 2010) and the gaze cueing literature that the computation of what or where someone else is looking is automatic in the sense that it is effortless and happens involuntarily, we showed that such computation is however not stimulus-driven. The mere presence of another person is not enough to engage in the computation of what or where that person is looking at. In a series of 3 experiments, we show the conditions that are necessary to trigger such computation. The full article can be found here.
Samson, Dana, Apperly, Ian A., Braithwaite, Jason J., Andrews, Benjamin J., & Scott, Sarah E. Bodley (2010). Seeing it their way : evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36(5), 1255-66. doi :10.1037/a0018729
Bukowski, Henryk, Hietanen, Jari K., & Samson, Dana (2016). From gaze cueing to perspective taking: Revisiting the claim that we automatically compute where or what other people are looking at. Visual Cognition, 23(8), 1020-1042. doi :10.1080/13506285.2015.1132804
Furlanetto, Tiziano, Becchio, Cristina, Samson, Dana, & Apperly, Ian (2015). Altercentric Interference in Level 1 Visual Perspective Taking Reflects the Ascription of Mental States, Not Submentalizing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 42(2), 158-163. doi :10.1037/xhp0000138
Putting oneself in another's shoes: do we really do that and when do we do it?
We recently showed that when we compute "how" an object is seen by someone else (level 2 visual perspective taking), we use an embodied mental rotation of our body, literally imagining ourselves in the other person's shoes. We do not use such mental rotation processes to solve all perspective taking problems however. For exemple, we do not use it when we simply compute whether an object is visible to someone else or not (level 1 visual perspective taking). These findings were published in two articles, one in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2013 and one in Cognition 2013.
We further showed that, while level 1 visual perspective taking occurs spontaneously in many situations, level 2 visual perspective taking only occurs spontaneously if we are engaged in an interactive task with someone else. These findings were published in two articles, both in Cognition: 2016 and 2016.
Surtees, Andrew, Apperly, Ian, & Samson, Dana (2016). I've got your number: Spontaneous perspectivetaking in an interactive task. Cognition, 150, 43-52. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.014
Surtees, Andrew, Samson, Dana, & Apperly, Ian (2016). Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen. Cognition, 148, 97-105. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.010
Surtees, Andrew David, Apperly, Ian, & Samson, Dana (2013). Similarities and differences in visual and spatial perspective-taking processes. Cognition, 129(2), 426-438. doi :10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.008
Surtees, Andrew David, Apperly, Ian, & Samson, Dana (2013). The use of embodied self-rotation for visual and spatial perspective-taking. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(698), doi :10.3389/fnhum.2013.00698